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Analysis of 'Responding to Failure: The Responsibility to Protect after Libya' by Christopher Hobson: A Critical Assessment

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Abstract:

The subject of 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) has attracted the interest of researchers, and remains controversial, both in theory and in practice. This piece of work examines the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) intervention in Libya in 2011. It assesses the decision to intervene based on the claim of humanitarian norms, on the one hand, and state interest, on the other hand. This paper will present reasons why the U.S. and some of its European allies intervened in Libya but not in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and other countries, where mass atrocities happened. The response to the crisis in Libya was remarkably quick, whereas, in many other cases of mass atrocity, those crimes have failed to generate sufficient and timely political will to protect civilians at risk. Humanitarian intervention is said to be undertaken because of concern for the well-being of civilians. Thus, this study based on Christopher Hobson's argument observes that due to the limitation of human physical and mental abilities, one can't predict the outcome of their actions accurately. However, intervening parties should be more cautious before the action. The humility theory serves as a framework for understanding the physical and mental constraints of humans. Humility is considered a significant factor in influencing human behaviour. The right intention of R2P does not lead to a good outcome all the time, because of human disability and limitations to control external events.

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تحليل 'الاستجابة للفشل: مسؤولية الحماية بعد ليبيا' بقلم كريستوفر هوبسون: تقييم نقدي

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المستخلص

لقد استحوذ موضوع "مسؤولية الحماية" على اهتمام الباحثين، ولا يزال مثيرا للجدل سواء من الناحية النظرية أو العملية. يتناول هذا العمل التدخل منظمة حلف شمال الأطلسي(ناتو) في ليبيا عام ٢٠١١. ويقيم قرار التدخل على أساس ادعاء المعايير الإنسانية من جهة، ومصلحة الدولة من جهة أخرى. ستقدم هذه الورقة أسباب تدخل الولايات المتحدة وبعض حلفائها الأوروبيين في ليبيا، ولكن ليس في رواندا ويوغوسلافيا ودول أخرى، حيث وقعت فظائع جماعية. وكانت الاستجابة للأزمة في ليبيا سريعة بشكل ملحوظ، في حين فشلت تلك الجرائم، في العديد من الحالات الأخرى من الفظائع الجماعية، في توليد الإرادة السياسية الكافية وفي الوقت المناسب لحماية المدنيين المعرضين للخطر. ويقال إن التدخل الإنساني يتم بسبب القلق على سلامة المدنيين. وبالتالي، فإن هذه الدراسة المبنية على حجة (كريستوفر هوبسن) تلاحظ أنه بسبب محدودية القدرات الجسدية والعقلية البشرية، لا يمكن للمرء التنبؤ بنتائج أفعاله بدقة. ومع ذلك، ينبغي للأطراف المتدخلة أن تكون أكثر حذرا قبل اتخاذ الإجراء. تعتبر نظرية التواضع بمثابة إطار لفهم القيود الجسدية والعقلية للبشر. يعتبر التواضع عاملا هاما في التأثير على السلوك البشري. إن النية الصحيحة للمسؤولية عن الحماية لا تؤدي إلى نتيجة جيدة في كل الأوقات، وذلك بسبب عجز الإنسان ومحدوديته في السيطرة على الأحداث الخارجية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: ليبيا، مسئولية الحماية، التدخل، الدولة، السيادة، نظرية التواضع.

Introduction

Since its existence, the R2P doctrine,[1] has faced critical views by many scholars, especially after the military intervention in Libya. Christopher Hobson's works are listed among those critiques. However, this work criticizes the R2P doctrine from quite a different angle. It has not concentrated on the legality or illegality of the term with which many other scholars are busy. This work's main argument examines the political challenges that shape the practices of R2P and the discourse that informs it.[2] The author does not reject the doctrine totally but he argues that, due to the limitation of our ability physically and mentally we can't predict the result of our actions. However, intervening parties should be more cautious before the action. This essay is divided into three sections. While the first section explains the summary of Hobson's article without any additional information, the

(1) The R2P doctrine, as outlined in 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (A/RES/60/1), embraces the notion of 'sovereignty as responsibility'. Consequently, it advocates for an expanded role of the international community concerning states that fail to safeguard their citizens from severe international crimes, including genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. In paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit, Heads of State and Government affirmed their commitment to protect their populations from such crimes, acknowledged their collective responsibility to support one another in upholding this commitment, and declared their readiness to take prompt and decisive action, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations, when national authorities fail to fulfil their duty to protect their populations. for more information see the link bellow :https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml#:~:text=Paragraphs%20on%20the%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect&text=Each%20individual%20State%20has%20the,through%20appropriate%20and%20necessary%20means.

(2) Christopher Hobson, "Responding to failure: The responsibility to protect after Libya," Millennium, Vol. 44, no. 3, 2016, p. 433

second and third sections emphasize the strengths and shortcomings of the article.

1- Methodology

This is a qualitative study of the "Responding to Failure: The Responsibility to Protect after Libya." The rationale for using the qualitative method in this study is that it focuses on the interpretation of qualitative data from different sources, not just the dispassionate presentation of statistical data. This work is dependent on empirical data collected from secondary sources. First of all, the author summarizes the original article and then illustrates the strengths and shortcomings of Hobson's Article through scholarly discussion.

I. A Humble Approach: Evaluating R2P and the Importance of Humility Theory in Hobson's Argument

Hobson uses the 'humility theory'(1) as a fashion to explain the physical and mental limitations of Human beings. The humility theory is an important guide in determining our actions. The well-meaning goals of R2P don't always result in favourable outcomes due to human incapacity and the inherent constraints in managing external circumstances. However, the author argues, that if the event happens and the failure of intervention occurs, one must not deny the result or avoid it, but face it directly and calculate the consequences. In the case of intervention in Libya based on R2P, the author attempts to illustrate that, humble approaches should be adopted. The R2P doctrine is related

(1) Humility theory entails acknowledging the limitations of human comprehension and understanding the risks associated with overestimating our capacity to influence outcomes.

to the classical work of realism which goes above the usual argument of self-interest, it emphasizes the dilemma of political action.[1] In this regard, the humble approach by Reinhold Niebuhr is a centre of importance. Humble approach to disciplining the use of force due to the limits of human knowledge. In the case of intervention to protect strangers this approach emphasized the physical and mental limits to know what will be achievable from the action. However, this is not a claim to prevent the agents from acting but to promote caution. The author argues, that in Libya at the beginning the war had not ended yet supporters declared the success of the intervention, but it did not take long before this success changed to failure.

The R2P emerged as a result of the failure of the international community's will to act in the humanitarian crisis. There are many cases the UN Security Council failed to respond properly. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) attempts to address this lack of political will of the state to act to protect civilians through the new term called responsibility. The responsibility here means it's the responsibility of the international community to prevent another mass atrocity (for example Genocide in Rwanda). According to the R2P doctrine, once a state fails to protect its citizens from four types of crime (genocide, war crime, ethnic cleansing, and crime against Humanity) it's the responsibility of the

(1) Hobson, op. cit., p. 435.

international community to protect them.(1) R2P also talks about three components of responsibility including preventing, reacting, and rebuilding, ICISS clearly emphasizes the importance of the first responsibility, intervention only can take place when the first fails, and the international community should use its effort so that the prevention does not fail. According to the Author, however providing political will to prevent, is the most difficult part of a responsibility, even though, it's very important theoretically. Furthermore, the Secretary General's advisers mentioned a successful application of R2P in different places such as Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, and Kyrgyzstan, however in talking about R2P people only think of the cases that Force has been used or failed to use (Darfur, Libya, Syria). However, the later cases came to define how R2P was understood.(2) There has been fear about the future of R2P, not because of its legal status – discussion about the legality of R2P by many scholars does not solve the practical problem that challenges conducting such an operation.(3)

As for the theoretical approach, realists are against humanitarian intervention because they believe that it's a license for strong states to intervene in weak state's affairs, and the action is conducted based on self-interest. In their anti-R2P arguments Brown, Orford, and De Waal argue that intervention cannot be separated from politics and that any assumption to remove politics from R2P produces illusion only. Even

(1) Ibid., p. 436.
(2) Ibid., p. 437.
(3) Ibid., pp. 437, 438.

prioritization of protection is not a neutral act. Thus, intervention means taking sides, and there are no innocent parties in this situation. Even though the aim of intervention might be good, it's clear that intervention leads to violence and war, therefore the result might be harmful.[1] Moses argues, that we should make an effort to make a bridge between hope and reality rather than saying good intentions bring good results all the time, as he supported this argument through Morgenthau's tragic vision of politics. For Morgenthau, the tragedy of life is awareness of irresolvable contradictions, which are characteristics of the nature of things that human beings are powerless to solve. Furthermore, Niebuhr agrees with Morgenthau that there is a tragic moment in life, but the tragic view of life is not viable, destructiveness is avoidable in human action. To explain his purpose Niebuhr proposes "the notion of Humility".[2] Humility helps acknowledge the limits of our comprehension and the dangers of our confidence in our capacity to draw the outcome. However, the appreciation of the physical and mental limitations creates the responsibility to generate a sense of caution when one is acting. However, this is not a justification for not acting. Though humility appreciates what we know and what we do not know and cannot know, this brings it with the sense of responsibility to face the consequences of our actions and accept failure when it occurs.[3]

(1) Ibid., p. 438.
(2) Ibid., p. 439.
(3) Ibid., pp. 440, 441.

In application of the theory on Libya, Hobson stated that the characteristic of the human emergency in Libya in 2011, got a fast international community's reaction, by forming international mobilization to prevent the atrocities, Gaddafi was ousted from power and followed by hope to establish a democratic system, but this hope vanished soon after the country fell into the chaotic situation. According to Anderson, the real tyranny is instability which followed NATO airstrikes and the fall of Gaddafi's regime.(1) Failure raises a question about what this experience means to Libyans and R2P doctrine. However, the truth left from the intervention in Libya is the incompleteness of our ability to comprehend such complex realities, which negatively affected people's lives. After the start of the uprisings, Gaddafi responded and threatened to eradicate the opponents and opposition supporters. Alex Bellamy stated, "Not since Rwanda has regimes so clearly demonstrated its intent to commit a crime against Humanity."(2) This clear threat caused two resolutions from the UNSC (Ros.1970 and 1973) that ended Gaddafi's power. There are contradictory arguments on whether the R2P had an impact on the decision or not, but for the proponent scholars (Paul Hein, Nicholas Kristof, and Anne-Marie Slaughter) and Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki-Moon, the intervention's decision was the determination of the international community to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians, and the decision to prevent Gaddafi to massacre people was legal and

(1) Ibid., p. 442.
(2) Ibid.

legitimate. Nevertheless, the decision soon changed from preventing Gaddafi from attacking civilians to supporting rebels to oust Gaddafi from power, thus overstepping the intervention's mandate.(1) Simon Adam (the R2P doctrine became entangled with the regime change) argues we can't be confused by those who believe that Gaddafi should have remained in his office. Hobson stated, Adam's argument is more rational than those claimed victory, however, this still supports the argument that intervention was necessary and justified.(2)

Authors argue that many authors rushed to support the R2P doctrine to be applicable in a wider range. However, by looking at the case of Syria and the importance of the doctrine of state sovereignty and human rights, we should update our assessment. The failure in Libya proved that it was more complicated than many people thought. This should generate more careful reflection on how it went wrong. Whether this failure could have been expected or not? It would be better for UNSC resolution 1973 to have a greater consensus than it had. The P3 powers (France, the UK, and the U.S.) didn't leave more opportunities for other powers to challenge their positions. It appears that the speed of actions pushed many states to support or abstain from the decision of intervention.(3) The fear of the repetition tragic of Rwanda and Srebrenica shut down all discussions about different alternatives. The fear of being responsible generates the momentum to

(1) Ibid., p. 443.
(2) Ibid., p. 444.
(3) Ibid., pp. 445, 446.

decide to use force despite the lack of a clear plan after intervention. Hobson argues the regression after the Libyan intervention has been seen by American officials and European diplomats. Chesterman argued that the Libyan case proved the significance of the R2P doctrine by making it harder to do the wrong thing or nothing at all. But the main question that should be asked is whether doing something better than nothing could become the wrong thing. Doyle argues that the intervention has a lack of strategic doctrine for how to protect people.[1] Although talking to the regime would be problematic it is unclear why would bring a bad outcome. When the threat of massacre is avoided it would be better to have a negotiation and peace talk, the failed negotiation would be better than a military intervention and regime change. If there were more time it would be better especially if there was a clear warning about the rebels that are not united and jihadi elements were present.[2]

According to the author, the basic assumption to ago for intervention was the threat of Gaddafi, but the rebels abused human rights as well. The people who supported rebelled against Gadhafi because he was committing crimes against humanity, however, they ignored the crimes against humanity if conducted by rebels.[3] Proponents of R2P may say that the international community's failure to uphold its responsibility to rebuild is the cause of failure and chaos

(1) Ibid., p. 447.
(2) Ibid., p. 448.
(3) Ibid.

in Libya because rebuilding is a part of R2P in the ICISS formulation. However, the author argues that the responsibility of rebuilding was missing in the "R2P lite" in 2005 .The problem related to the responsibility to rebuild, as Reiff criticizes the architect of R2P, wishes for a commitment that never existed, and even this commitment does not guarantee success, as has been seen in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq before.(1) The author argues that there should have been more carefulness about what would be the consequences of the intervention. Of course, some elements could not be predicted, and that's what the humble approach is all about. There are possible outcomes that we may not expect until occur. For example, the rise of the Islamic State in Libya was something that we could not see.

Many things could be predicted such as the lack of conditions to transition to democracy, the rebels were not reliable or united, there was no clear plan about what to do after ousting Gaddafi, and unlikely of using resources by the international community to rebuild. However, the advocators of intervention have responsibility for the outcome that intervention brings.(2) The author argues that while the case of Libya already took place we should be more cautious about Syria and other humanitarian emergencies. There should be a moment to think of what R2P brought to Libya before any intervention, and it's important to understand the complexity of the situation and the harms that follow the intervention. Finally, the author argues that, in some cases, the

(1) Ibid., p. 449.
(2) Ibid., p. 450.

intervention might be justified, but the level of threat should be much higher than in Kosovo and Libya.(1)

II. Exploring the Article's Robust Insights through Comprehensive Examination of its Strengths

In line with Hobson's call for more prudence in intervention decision-making, the humble approach's proponents will receive special attention. However, the following arguments might not focus on humility as deeply as the author of this article has done but in one way or another serve the interest of this argument. As Gareth Evans Co-Chair of ICISS stated, the preventive component of R2P must be limited to the imminent mass atrocities and not extend to longer-term prevention efforts.(2) Evans argues that R2P must be used in the right place and right time. He warns that using the R2P too broadly risks diluting its capacity to mobilize international consensus in the cases in which it is needed.(3) This claim has sympathy with Hobson's claim that the Libyan case created a situation of distrust to not intervene in Syria or any future crisis.(4)

Alan Kuperman also criticizes military operations under the R2P doctrine and claims that it has caused genocide and more violence

(1) Ibid., p. 451.
(2) Alex J. Bellamy, "The responsibility to protect—five years on," *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2010, p. 159.
(3) Gareth Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution), 2008, p. 28.
(4) Kathrin Bachleitner, "International memories in global politics: Making the case for or against UN intervention in Libya and Syria." *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 2,2023, p.283.

which would never have happened otherwise, because R2P encouraged rebels to a risky armed revolution that provoked the government to use violence, and encouraged international forces to intervene rather than finding a political solution.(1) Eric Paterson criticizes unthinking of post-intervention decisions, which mostly lack moral principles in considering order, justice, and conciliation after the war period. He argues that I accept, that there is a consensus about the R2P's aim to provide peace, but what kind of peace he asks, we can only understand our post-war responsibilities when we have some prior idea about our future.(2) Hobson raised the same concern about the future and the result of R2P's action because humans are not completely physically and mentally able to predict future events. Larry May also in her "Post-Just War" arguments said that, if we are not able to rebuild or return things to their original place the war is not just. However, she concluded, that due to the uncertain state of war, it's not easy to calculate the outcome, so instead of participating in a moral risk and killing innocent people in an unjust war, is better not to initiate war in the first place. Even though May uses this argument in just war theory, it's not different from the Humility approach in Hobson's article.(3)

Michael Neu in "*The Tragedy of Justified War"* brings something close to the previous argument as he states, that there needs

(1) Charles E. Ziegler, "Critical perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: BRICS and beyond," *International Relations,* Vol. 30, No. 3, 2016, p. 266.
(2) Carl Ceulemans, "After the Dust Settles: Reflections on Postwar Justice," *Millennium,* Vol. 42, No.3, 2014, p. 909.
(3) Ibid., p.911.

to be an awareness of tragedies of justified war, by preventing the war itself in the first place. The tragedy for him is "the situation in which moral agents cannot avoid wronging at least one person through an act or an omission."[1] Neu suggests that the tragedy should be prevented if there is the possibility to prevent it. Actors who participate in the war should carefully examine their actions; to know their actions today may not end up being a cause of tragedies of justified war in the future.[2] Neu uses tragedy in his suggestion but it is closer to Hobson's humble approach than Morgenthau's tragedy theory because Hobson argues that interveners under the R2P doctrine should think twice before the intervention and should know the probability of outcomes.

In their influential article in "*International Affairs"* Mary Martin and Tayler Owen argue that the term of human security has vanished from the R2P discourse, because of its emphasis on intervention militarily.[3] This criticism was also mentioned in the 2010, General Assembly's report on human security which makes a distinction between human security and the use of force. As noted earlier, the concept of human security excludes the use of force; its focus should be on fostering government and domestic capabilities to strengthen resilience to emerging challenges in a way that reinforces prevention.[4]

(1) Michael Neu, "The tragedy of justified war," *International Relations*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2013, p. 462.
(2) Ibid., p. 465.
(3) David Chandler, "Resilience and human security: The post-interventionist paradigm," *Security dialogue*, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2012, p. 215.
(4) Ibid.

Hobson brought up Francis Deng's (founder and supporter of R2P) claim that there are many cases in which prevention was successfully conducted based on R2P doctrine, however not many people talk about it because they are more hurry to intervene. David Chandler's "*Resilience and human security: The post-interventionist Paradigm*" argues the post-intervention situation should be given more importance. In the application of this paradigm, the focus should go to prevention rather than intervention and empowerment rather than protection.(1) According to Deng, the intervention is not as important as the prevention, which is mentioned in the first two pillars of R2P.(2) However, the prevention got less attention from media coverage and people.(3) Hobson has addressed this issue, contending that providing political will to prevent is the most difficult part of responsibility even theoretically prevention is important. The Secretary-General advisers for R2P, mentioned a successful application of R2P in different places such as Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, and Kyrgyzstan, however in talking about R2P people only think of the cases that force has used or failed to use (Darfur, Libya, Syria). This tells that in the application of theory into practice supporters of R2P need more work to promote prevention at both top-down and bottom-up levels.

(1) Ibid., p. 216.
(2) Charles Cater and David M. Malone, "The origins and evolution of Responsibility to Protect at the UN," *International Relations*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2016, p. 286.
(3) Oliver Stuenkel, "Brazil and Responsibility to Protect: a case of agency and norm entrepreneurship in the Global South," *International Relations*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2016, p. 379.

Hobson suggests that when the threat of massacre is avoided it would be better to have a negotiation and peace talk; the failed negotiation would be better than a military intervention and regime change. In the work "*What if R2P Was—Truly — Everyone's Business? Exploring the Individual Responsibility to Protect"* in 2016, Coralie Pison Hindawi examines that, many UNSC members criticized the military operation for two reasons:(1)

III. First the interpretation of the mandate to remove Gaddafi from power; The second, the fact that military operation in Libya didn't stop when the threat of attack reduced.

Moreover, Tom Pierre Najem et al. in their article "*Was R2P a viable option for Syria? Opinion content in the Globe and Mail and the National Post, 2011–2013,"* added that, intervening parties in the case of Libya have no appetite for another intervention after Libya.(2)

In line with Hobson *(Many things could be predicted such as a lack of conditions to transition to democracy, the rebels were not reliable or united, there being no clear plans about what to do after ousting Gaddafi, and unlikely to use resources the international community to rebuild)* about shortcomings of the R2P doctrine, in his article "*From ISIS to ICISS: A critical return to the Responsibility to Protect report"* Philip Cunliffe suggests, the crisis in the post-intervention in Libya is

(1) Coralie Pison Hindawi, "What if R2P Was—Truly—Everyone's Business? Exploring the Individual Responsibility to Protect," *Alternatives*, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2016, p. 31.

(2) Tom Pierre Najem, et. al., "Was R2P a viable option for Syria? Opinion content in the Globe and Mail and the National Post, 2011–2013," *International Journal*, Vol. 71, No. 3, 2016, p. 440.

something that could be expected with R2P doctrine even in the earlier classical form of intervention.(1) Cunliffe asks on whom behalf intervention takes place. He goes a step further than Hobson (*On whose behalf the responsibility to protect will be exercised*), by saying, this paternalism applies to the people of intervener countries in supporting intervention.(2) In Hobson's argument, it's difficult for any party to be impartial and not take a side. Charles Ziegler also worries about impartiality during the conflict and application of R2P. He suggests, that although few countries might be well-intentioned to deploy their forces in the middle of the civil war, it's difficult to avoid taking a side in such conflicts, which makes the prospect of moral result unlikely.(3) Finally, Ronald Paris supports Hobson's claim that most of the literature emphasizes the legality of the R2P doctrine and asks whether it is legal or illegal to intervene, while they do less touch upon the question of "how" military intervention could be used to prevent mass killings.(4)

IV. Identifying the Flaws within the Article: A Comprehensive Analysis

Despite its strength, the article has several shortcomings to be examined, this essay attempts to reveal some of the shortcomings here. However, this does not diminish the value of this article, which is a

(1) Philip Cunliffe, "From ISIS to ICISS: A critical return to the Responsibility to Protect report," *Cooperation and conflict*, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2016, p. 234.
(2) Ibid., p. 235.
(3) Ziegler, op. cit., p. 266.
(4) Ibid., p. 272.

well-valued contribution to this field. First of all, it's clear that R2P is described as a political commitment to prevent four specific types of crimes, which is not established to apply to a specific case in a specific time but it's rather applicable to all cases and circumstances. Therefore, the question of whether R2P applies to this or that situation is wrong, the question should be; how best R2P will be exercised.(1) Even though Hobson does not reject R2P it restricts its application to the situation base and asks how much R2P applies to cases like Libya. This is a wrong question according to Bellamy. The application of R2P and the prevention should be conducted in a time before the crime starts to happen because once the crimes are about to happen the prevention window is about to close.(2) Although the R2P doctrine emphasizes the post-conflict and the responsibilities of parties to rebuild the country, Walzer and May argue that not all the countries remain obliged to the R2P's last pillar, some parties may have less respect for the obligation than others. (3) However, it is important to know that a post-war conflict in one case (for example Libya) cannot be extrapolated to all other cases.

Moreover, R2P intends to generate speech and warning and provide the consensus necessary to mobilize an international response. As Evans said the language of R2P is; capable of generating effective responses to extreme cases that the previous term of humanitarian

(1) Bellamy, op. cit., P.158.
(2) Ibid., P.159.
(3) Ceulemans, op. cit., p.915.

intervention could not provide.[1] Michael Walzer, in the argument about "post-just war," suggests that leaving the brutal regimes to continue to pose a threat to the lives of thousands of people would be nothing more than irresponsibility.[2] Even though, it's early to decide whether the indication of R2P is positive or not, however, according to the 'Uppsala Conflict Data Program'[3] there has been a sharp decline in the number of atrocities and violence after the adaptation of the R2P doctrine.[4] One may say that having fewer atrocities during this period is not necessarily related to the adaptation of R2P.[5] I also doubt if this applies to the after-Arab Spring situations. Robert Royal argues that it would not be realistic to think that we can turn every war-torn society into a perfect democracy.[6] According to Hobson likewise, it was clear that Libya would not be a democratic country, because of Militia groups and not having good institutions. From this point, one may think that he does not support intervention in the first place, even in the condition of brutal use of force. Since Libya will not turn into a democracy why parties should bother to participate in intervention? Brian Orend in contrast suggested, that having a minimal regime that

(1) Bellamy, op. cit., P.159.
(2) Ceulemans, op. cit., P.909.
(3) The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is the leading global resource for information on organized violence and is the oldest continuously operating data collection initiative focused on civil wars. for more information see the link bellow: https://ucdp.uu.se/
(4) Bellamy, op. cit., P.163.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ceulemans, op. cit., p. 909.

satisfies human rights would be enough to replace an aggressive regime.(1)

Another important point to mention is; that intervention should be conducted, because people must "see" that justice is done in the war zones not only "Done." The punishment of perpetrators should be seen by defeating them. However, if Hobson's Philosophy is correct in saying regime change and intervention in Libya is wrong then justice cannot be seen.(2) I say that the R2P doctrine has not mentioned regime change, which it should. Furthermore, Hobson undermines the talk on legality of R2P by saying; that too much has been written on legality without solving the real problem, but Walzer said this should not be neglected. Sometimes illegal base war like Iraq brings a good outcome. This might be controversial but one can say that despite having instability, in contrast to Hobson majority of Iraqis may think that the outcome of the illegal Iraq war was good.(3) It has been argued that waging war without knowing the outcome might be justified by looking at what has been done by Nazi Germany. This should not be in line with the war-pro argument but not waging war might result in moral disaster, more killings, and harm.(4) This might be true for the R2P doctrine, which is against Hobson's claim. Non-intervention in Libya might lead to more killings than what has been seen so far.

(1) Ibid., p. 910.
(2) Ibid., pp. 910, 911.
(3) Ibid., p. 914.
(4) Neu, op. cit., p. 466.

Therefore, if Hobson is right, one could talk about the immorality of non-intervention in Libya as well.

Hobson's point of view on the sovereignty of the state has some paradoxical points because in one place argues that, his argument should not be looked at through the lens of sovereignty defender but rather how wise intervention is, in another place said that, by looking at the case of Syria and the importance of the doctrine for state sovereignty and human rights, we should update our assessment of intervention in Libya.(1) About the parties to intervene Hobson explains, who has the right to intervene? And on behalf of whom? He meant that there is no consent by people for international intervention and it is not clear who will be the party to intervene, however James Pattison in talking about humanitarian intervention argue that NATO can be a legitimate agent, a shared operation by UN members, and if these agents fail to intervene we should look for alternatives.(2) Thus, the main purpose for him is the protection of humans from mass atrocities. Peltonen also argues that the R2P falls upon all the international community's members collectively, whether they are states, governmental and non-governmental organizations, advocacy groups, and the media.(3)

Some people criticize using Niebuhr's Humility approach in Hobson's article. Niebuhr himself distrusts social or group morality.

(1) Hobson, op. cit., p.445.
(2) Hindawi, op. cit., p.33.
(3) Ibid., p. 34.

Hindawi argues that if this is true then "every effort to transfer pure morality of disinterestedness to group relations has failed. Though, one should not expect the state to behave ethically."[1] I say that if Niebuhr distrusts social morality then how he expect R2P doctrine supporters to stick to moral principles all the time? The author also talked about the humble approach at the unit level (first pillar) he stated, humans should be humble and that he/she has a mental and physical disability to know everything, however, he dealt with the case of Libya at the state, (second Pillar). He looks at the state as a black box, he never pays attention to the role of world leaders in the decision-making about R2P to intervene in Libya and not intervene in Syria and other cases. Some leaders have a high awareness that if they do not intervene they will be accountable for any mass killing if happens.[2] Hobson also should consider the role of individuals in conducting mass atrocities before the intervention, because the intervention is a result of human action killing innocent people.[3] However, the action is something strictly related to human morality.

Hobson's main claim is the international community has not calculated the outcome of intervention very well and this is a failure, however Luke Glanville in *"Does R2P matter? Interpreting the impact of a norm"* argues that what made the Libyan case exceptional was "clear threat of mass atrocities by Gaddafi, his lack of powerful allies,

(1) Ibid., p. 36.
(2) Ibid., p.37.
(3) Ibid., p.41.

and explicit request from the league of Arab states for action, which intervene in Libya viable option." From this explanation, I can expect that intervening parties were fully aware of what would happen if the intervention was not conducted.(1) One may also say that the outcome of intervention in Syria might be calculated very well that's why Obama decided not to intervene as he suggested we can't militarily intervene every time we see injustice in the world. Military intervention in Syria may do more harm than good.(2) From Obama's talk, nothing is as much as clear as having a good calculation of the result of the intervention.

The soul of R2P is to take an important step toward human security. R2P tells us that human security must be the centre of the international community's effort to have a better world. R2P aims to pressure governments to respond to humanitarian poor conditions it appears. It also tells that more than being rights, R2P is a duty, which makes the task be seen as a moral principle to take decisive action.(3) According to Marni Soupcoff, Hobson stated that in Libya opposition groups used violence, and intervening parties didn't say much about, while they intervened because of the violence used by Gaddafi's regime, if this is true for Libya then it's far truer for Syria.(4) I now ask, should the international community intervene in Syria? If not, would

(1) Luke Glanville, "Does R2P matter? Interpreting the impact of a norm," *Cooperation and conflict*, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2016, p. 192.
(2) Ibid., p. 196.
(3) Tom Pierre Najem, et. al., op. cit., p. 434,435.
(4) Ibid., p. 441.

military intervention become a cause of more killings than half a Million of Syrians? Hobson should answer these questions to support his argument.

Finally, Bellamy agrees with Hobson that R2P cannot stop permanent members of the UNSC from protecting their allies, but he claims that R2P changed the world. The evidence for that is widespread in states' attempts to get the consent of R2P before an intervention, which is of the greatest advantage.(1) R2P's influence to intervene in Libya was evidence of its efficacy, and nonintervention in Syria is not R2P's failure.(2) It's important to say that R2P is not a perfect doctrine even Evans argues that R2P has some institutional and political mobilization challenges that should be solved.(3) I would consequently say that Hobson's Humility approach is useful to be used before any human actions. However, how much this approach is applicable during the action is an unanswered question. Hobson himself did not tell us; that if the application of R2P was wrong in Libya, then what is the ideal type of intervention that he wishes to see? The application of the Humility approach in reality is very difficult if not impossible.

(1) Aidan Hehir, Review of the book, *The Responsibility to Protect: A Defense* by Alex J. Bellamy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 81.
(2) Ibid.
(3) David Chandler, "The Paradox of the 'Responsibility to Protect," *Cooperation and Conflict,* Vol. 45, No. 1, 2010, p. 129.

Conclusion

The work has examined the international community's reaction to the crisis in Libya and the 2011 intervention through critical analysis of Hobson's Article. Libya was the first case in which R2P was applied against a government failing to protect its citizens. For the first time in history, the Security Council authorized member states to take all necessary measures, except for occupying forces, with the primary objective of protecting civilians and civilian populated areas under the threat of attack. Even though in Libya the concern to stop human suffering was noted, other motives for intervening in Libya were present.

In light of R2P doctrines, the international community must intervene in cases in which the state cannot protect its people or the state itself harms civilians. R2P allows the international community to intervene only in the situations mentioned earlier. The intervention also should be run under the auspices of the international organization like the UN along with regional organizations. Thus, in the Libyan crisis, despite the role of international and regional organizations and existing international norms, their role was limited and most probably controlled by states and official elites. Furthermore, advocates states paralyzed the regional organizations in the case of Libyan intervention. In addition, Western countries had different reasons for their specific actions in the Libyan case. Thus, domestic politics and economic and geostrategic interests dominated the discussion about humanitarian interventions in the country. When the UNSC approved military intervention in Libya, the advocates and adversary states necessarily had to declare their different interests in the Libyan case. The countries that had only limited interests in Libya refused to participate in Libyan intervention. While the advocate states attempted to use different arguments to justify their participation in the Libyan intervention. Consequently, the resistance toward intervention in Libya and R2P

shows the use of a double standard approach in cases of humanitarian needs and intervention. Critics of R2P have stressed that it is problematic that interventions are conducted on a case-by-case basis and hence based on selective national concern, meaning that states interfere selectively and not all the time. It is not likely that R2P once again will be used as the legitimate framework of an intervention due to massive resistance from several countries.

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